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ABSTRACT
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is 
a landmark agreement in the history of the nuclear disarmament 
movement. It was negotiated against the wishes of the nuclear- 
armed states and many of their supporters and this context defines 
the challenges and opportunities for its universalisation. We argue 
that universalisation should be understood as a strategy for maximis-
ing the authority of the treaty and its core norms and principles 
across four categories of state: disarmament advocacy states, a non- 
nuclear-armed state majority, nuclear client states, and nuclear- 
armed states. We show how these norms and principles are exten-
sions of what already exists, particularly for non-nuclear armed states, 
but that making these connections will require targeted and sus-
tained political work. We argue that states parties to the TPNW 
working with civil society will need to engage non-nuclear armed 
states with a range of normative arguments for the treaty and against 
the narratives of its critics. This can be done through a range of 
outreach activities based on other treaty universalisation campaigns, 
and we set these out in detail. Engaging nuclear client states and 
nuclear-armed states will be more difficult and require a different 
approach based on carving open a discursive space in which the 
TPNW’s humanitarian, ethics, and risk rationales must be confronted. 
Political opposition will be formidable, but the purpose of the TPNW 
is to influence the nuclear weapons policies of nuclear-armed states, 
and increasing the authority of the treaty’s norms and principles 
through universalisation strategies will be essential to this.
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The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was negotiated in 2017 and 
entered into force on 22 January 2021, 90 days after Honduras became the 50th signatory 
to ratify the treaty in October 2020. Those 50 states and subsequent members are 
required under Article 12 on “Universality” to “encourage States not party to the 
Treaty to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty, with the goal of universal 
adherence of all States to the Treaty.” But what does it mean for members of the TPNW 
to pursue universalisation in the context of the global politics of nuclear disarmament? 
This article examines this question in three steps. First, it uses norm theory to explain 
why universalisation matters in relation to political authority, what universalisation 
means for the TPNW in the context of the politics of its negotiation, and what is being 
“universalised” in terms of the treaty’s core norms and principles. Second, the article 
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argues that different states and regions will require different strategies to encourage and 
facilitate ratification and it outlines the narratives and activities needed to engage non- 
nuclear armed states to grow the treaty’s membership. The final part outlines practices 
for engaging nuclear client states and, perhaps, nuclear-armed states.
Why Universalise the Treaty?
Maximising the Treaty’s Political Authority
Universalisation of the TPNW should be understood as a strategy to maximise the 
authority of the treaty’s norms and principles in order to influence the nuclear weapons 
policies of nuclear-armed states and “nuclear client states” – those states such as NATO 
members on behalf of whom nuclear deterrent threats are made by nuclear patrons – in 
the direction of nuclear disarmament. These states are, by definition, the ultimate target 
for the TPNW.1
This reflects a theory of change about state behaviour that emphasises the role of 
norms, identity and international law in shaping what, how and why states act as they do 
(see Katzenstein 1996). It is rooted in a much broader debate on state behaviour and the 
role of ideational factors like norms, compared to the role of material factors or domestic 
politics and the possibility of moral progress in world politics (Price 2008). This debate is 
rooted in competing understandings of power, interests and causality. Explanations of 
world politics that take ideational factors seriously have shown how change can be driven 
by contestation about norms, as Risse and Sikkink (1999) have shown in relation to 
human rights and Bower (2015) in relation to the Mine Ban Treaty.
The TPNW is an example of such a change that aims to precipitate further change. In 
this case, the legal and normative contestation that the treaty represents creates oppor-
tunities for the treaty to contribute to change in nuclear weapons policies by authorising, 
mobilising, and enabling states, NGOs, IGOs, corporations and others to act on the 
treaty’s core norms and principles. The “contribute to” caveat is important because 
ideational factors do not determine outcomes, instead they “shape realms of possibility. 
They influence (increase or decrease) the probability of occurrence of certain courses of 
action” (Tannenwald 1999, 435).2 Moreover, it is widely accepted by supporters of the 
TPNW that the treaty by itself is unlikely to lead to a world without nuclear weapons, but 
that an unequivocal legal-normative prohibition based on a reframing of nuclear weap-
ons in terms of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear violence is an essential step 
towards that goal. The text of the treaty itself recognises that “a legally binding prohibi-
tion of nuclear weapons constitutes an important contribution towards the achievement 
and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons” (UNGA 2015, 2, emphasis added). 
Moreover, core states in the “humanitarian initiative on nuclear weapons” (see Kmentt 
2015; Ritchie and Egeland 2018) that precipitated the TPNW purposefully framed 
a prohibition treaty as an not the “effective measure” relating to the obligation under 
1We have used the term “nuclear client states” because more familiar terms like “umbrella states”, ’extended deterrence 
states’ and “nuclear alliance states” tend to imply an objective protective benefit for these states from the nuclear 
weapons of their nuclear patron, which is in fact contested.
2Tannenwald provides a useful introduction to the role of ideational and material factors in explaining choices on the use 
of nuclear weapons in the United States after 1945 in relation to the concept of a normative taboo
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Article VI of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to 
pursue “effective measures” for nuclear disarmament (New Agenda Coalition 2014).3
Critics of the treaty tend to frame universalisation not as a strategy to effect further 
change, but as an impossible-to-achieve goal of full global membership as if the treaty by 
itself will lead to global nuclear disarmament. They argue that universalisation in this 
sense of it being an “end” rather than a “means to an end” is not possible because the 
nuclear-armed states have rejected the treaty and therefore the treaty will fail on these 
terms. It is on this basis that the treaty’s supporters have been accused of “magical 
thinking” in terms of the TPNW somehow leading directly to nuclear disarmament (Ford 
2018). Moreover, critics argue that the effect of ideational factors like norms and laws on 
the nuclear weapons policies of nuclear-armed states is very limited and will remain so 
(Onderco 2017, 7; Vilmer 2020). However, this concept of universalisation as an “end” 
isn’t very useful because it elides the highly contested context of the TPNW’s negotiation.
The TPNW and the humanitarian initiative emerged in response to the permanence of 
nuclear weapons in global politics, the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament and the 
systemic risk of nuclear war this entails. For a majority of non-nuclear armed states, the 
risks of the use of nuclear weapons and the scale of the humanitarian consequences that 
would follow make nuclear disarmament an urgent priority. They see the implementa-
tion of the obligations and commitments made by nuclear armed states to disarm as far 
from satisfactory or credible. With these states showing no indication of changing their 
stance on nuclear disarmament, non-nuclear-armed states came to see establishing an 
unequivocal prohibition of nuclear weapons as the only effective nuclear disarmament 
measure they could take themselves that could not be blocked by the nuclear-armed 
states. The TPNW can therefore be understood as a legal-normative challenge to the ways 
in which nuclear-armed states and their supporters continue to claim that nuclear 
weapons, nuclear deterrence and their potential use are legitimate and necessary. 
Unsurprisingly, the five states recognised as nuclear weapon states (NWS) under the 
NPT (US, Russia, France, China, UK) opposed this challenge (Ritchie 2019).
Thinking about universalisation in terms of a goal of full global membership there-
fore makes little sense, at least in the short-term, because the treaty is a symptom of 
a political context of deep division on the treaty’s main objective: nuclear disarmament. 
The very factors that drove the treaty’s negotiation are those that have led the nuclear- 
armed states and their supporters to reject it. States parties to the TPNW that 
encourage other states to join the treaty (as they have committed to do under Article 
12), therefore promote an approach to nuclear weapons that all nuclear-armed states 
see as being in opposition to their current national security interests and political 
priorities. The TPNW is therefore different to treaties that have accrued near-universal 
membership, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) negotiated in 1993 
that banned chemical weapons, or the Montreal Protocol negotiated in 1987 to phase 
out and ban ozone-depleting chemicals, because the TPNW’s negotiation did not 
involve key centres of power in world politics, notably the US but also Russia, China, 
Japan, India and NATO-Europe. In contrast, negotiation of the CWC involved the 
3Article VI of the NPT states that “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on 
a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”.
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world’s major possessors of chemical weapons, especially the US and Russia, and the 
negotiation of the Montreal Protocol involved the world’s major producers of ozone- 
depleting chemicals, such as the US, European Community, and Japan. Consequently, 
thinking about universalisation only in terms of an “end” of full global membership for 
the TPNW is unhelpful. Universalisation understood as a strategy to effect change by 
maximising the treaty’s authority is much more relevant because it invites engagement 
with the politics and practices of spreading and embedding the authority of the treaty 
and its core norms, principles and rationales.
Universalisation and Authority
Even if the goal of full global membership is not on the cards in the near term, numbers 
still matter because a substantial and growing membership is at the heart of any strategy 
to increase the authority of the treaty. As Villiger argues in Customary International Law 
and Treaties: “The number of parties to a convention may indicate whether the State 
community regards the convention as the desirable law for its organization. This political 
authority increases with a greater number of States participating in the drafting of the 
convention and expressing themselves in favour of the draft . . . and finally accepting the 
instrument” (Villiger 1985, 148, emphasis in original). Generally speaking, then, the 
greater the number of states that accept a treaty’s rules as authoritative over them, the 
greater the political authority of the treaty’s principles, norms and obligations in world 
politics (Hirsch and Dixon 2020, 5).
If the community of states that has accepted the authority of a treaty remains relatively 
low and major centres of power remain outside it, then it will be open to contestation by 
those that disagree with and oppose the treaty. However, maximising the authority of 
a treaty through growing membership can increase the authority of its core norms and 
principles, even for those that contest and remain outside it (Bower 2015). This can 
mitigate the effects of contestation and attempts to delegitimise a treaty. On this basis, 
states that accept a treaty’s norms, rules and obligations as legitimate and want to 
maximise their authority through a treaty should therefore sign and ratify it.
Moreover, the greater the authority of a treaty, the greater the political mandate to 
engage in activities to promote the treaty, its norms and obligations, which can include an 
obligation to work for a treaty’s universalisation of the type stipulated in the TPNW. Such 
a mandate can be particularly important when a treaty’s norms encounter resistance 
from powerful states, as is the case with the TPNW. Authority can then be leveraged to 
mobilise members, develop agendas, engage with hold-outs, and galvanise individual and 
collective actions based on a legitimate obligation to do so.
Universalisation as a strategy is therefore based on maximising the authority and 
therefore the effect of the treaty in world politics, and accruing membership is central to 
this: it increases the community of states that accept the treaty’s norms and obligations as 
legitimate and a collective mandate to promote them under Article 12. It will, thus, be 
crucial for the treaty to see a steady growth of states joining it to maintain its momentum 
beyond its entry into legal force. For the TPNW, every additional ratification is an 
opportunity to demonstrate that a delegitimisation of nuclear weapons and nuclear 
deterrence is taking place and that its norms and principles are taking root.
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But the success of a universalisation strategy also goes beyond the quantitative and 
legal dimension of the number of treaty ratifications and encompasses the extent to 
which the authority of the treaty and its core norms and principles become embedded in 
national and world politics. Here, success is understood in terms of increased interna-
tional pressure for the prohibition of nuclear weapons together with growing acceptance 
of the TPNW’s underlying arguments about the unacceptable humanitarian conse-
quences of nuclear use and the unavoidable risks of nuclear violence, leading to broad 
acceptance of the necessity of nuclear disarmament and the illegitimacy of nuclear 
weapons. Success in this sense is not limited to policy change in target states, but also 
about changing the terms of the debate itself through education, agenda-setting, advo-
cacy, contestation and capacity-building.4 In this broader sense, universalisation efforts 
as demanded by Article 12 of the TPNW are possibly the key aspect of its intended 
transformational effect.
It is here that increasing the authority of the treaty through ratifications can also have an 
important effect on what it means to be an NPT non-nuclear weapon state, and this can 
heighten the effect of the treaty on nuclear client states in particular. Key to this is the 
relationship between norms and identity. Finnemore and Sikkink outline the distinction 
between regulative norms “which order and constrain behavior”, and constitutive norms 
“which create new actors, interests, or categories of action” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 
891). Norms and principles of nuclear disarmament are both regulative and constitutive: 
they prescribe and proscribe certain behaviours but they also shape state identities, such as 
“non-nuclear weapon state”, “nuclear weapon state”, “rogue state”, “nuclear supplier state”, 
and so on. Universalisation of the TPNW is therefore not just about reinforcing and 
extending regulation (including prohibition), but about expanding what it means to be 
an NPT non-nuclear weapon state. The more NPT non-nuclear weapon states join the 
TPNW, the more its norms, principles and rationales become intertwined with what it 
means to be an NPT non-nuclear weapon state. It is at this level that we see the cognitive 
dissonance for nuclear client states who on the one hand identify as NPT non-nuclear 
weapon states committed to nuclear disarmament – the core aim of the TPNW – and on 
the other as supporters of nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons. Groups and group 
identification matter in norm theory because evidence shows that compliance with norms 
relies on the extent to which others in a state’s in-group also comply (Onderco 2017). 
International/group recognition as both a “responsible” NPT non-nuclear weapon state 
and a nuclear client state pulls these states in different directions. We know that conflicts 
between different normative systems generate tensions that can lead to change and this is 
where the TPNW can have an effect by foregrounding this normative and political tension 
and cognitive dissonance for client states (Sandholtz 2008).
In sum, universalisation as a strategy for maximising authority is a more nuanced way 
of understanding universalisation that takes the political context of the TPNW seriously. 
Moreover, it provides a coherent response to some critics of the TPNW who argue it will 
fail because its core norm of unconditional prohibition will not gain the support of all 
states, at least not in the short-term (Vilmer 2020). The diagnosis is right insofar as 
4The increase in international pressure through the mobilisation of discursive and institutional power by a large number 
of non-nuclear-armed states was a key indicator of the success of the humanitarian initiative (see Ritchie and Egeland 
2018).
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a norm of unconditional prohibition looks unlikely to sweep through the communities of 
nuclear-armed states and nuclear client states any time soon. But it limits the conception 
of “success” to universalisation as an end of full global membership and, in doing so, 
sidesteps the politics of the environment into which the TPNW emerged. Full universa-
lisation via the accession of nuclear-armed and nuclear client states seems some way off 
because of the deep contestation between how we understand security in terms of nuclear 
disarmament and nuclear deterrence. The theory of change underpinning the TPNW is 
that the treaty will have an important effect on the systems of meaning that constitute 
nuclear weapons in nuclear-armed states and nuclear client states because of the author-
ity of the new treaty and its norms and principles. What that effect will be remains to be 
seen. However, we can expect these efforts to be actively and vehemently opposed by 
sceptics of the treaty. This will necessarily have a significant bearing on universalisation 
strategies for the TPNW, explored below.
The TPNW's Core Norms and Principles
Before examining universalisation strategies, it is important to set out the TPNW’s core 
norms and principles5, four of which, we argue, are the most significant in terms of the 
treaty’s rationales:
1) A principle of the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons without conditions.
2) A principle of the unacceptability of indiscriminate nuclear violence.
3) A norm of progress towards nuclear disarmament and its realisation embedded in 
the NPT and the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the 
legality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
4) A norm of remediation for harms caused by the past or future use of nuclear 
weapons, including nuclear tests.
1) The core principle of the TPNW is the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons 
without conditions. The NPT prohibits nuclear weapons for its non-nuclear weapon state 
members only. The five NPT NWS and other nuclear-armed states outside the treaty are 
not subject to such a prohibition. The NPT NWS have often claimed that this exemption 
grants them a “right” to nuclear weapons. In international humanitarian law (IHL), NWS 
exempted these weapons from the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions that sets out core obligations upon states regarding the treatment of 
civilians and combatants in warfare and constraints on violence according to customary 
principles of proportionality and discrimination (Bring and Reimann 1986, 103). On this 
basis, the TPNW was framed as filling a “legal gap” in the prohibition of weapons of mass 
destruction since there was no unequivocal and explicit prohibition of the development, 
use, production, transfer, and possession of nuclear weapons in international law com-
parable to chemical and biological weapons via the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention 
and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) (Article 36/Reaching 
Critical Will 2015).
5Norms refer to “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity” (Katzenstein 1996, 5). 
Principles refer to “those beliefs of fact, causation and morality that collectively serve to promote a broader goal” (Tarzi 
1998, 14).
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2) The principle of the unacceptability of indiscriminate nuclear violence is made clear 
in the TPNW’s preamble and Article 1(d) that prohibits both the use and threat of use of 
nuclear weapons because of the foreseeable humanitarian and environmental effects of 
widespread and indiscriminate violence through nuclear detonations. The treaty there-
fore represents an unequivocal rejection of a nuclear deterrence-based approach to 
national and world security in light of the consequences of nuclear weapons explosions 
and the risks of nuclear use inherent in nuclear deterrence postures, as well as of 
accidents, miscalculation and human and technical errors. The principle is legitimated 
through international humanitarian law, human rights law and environmental law 
captured in UN General Assembly resolution 1653 (1961) on a “Declaration on the 
Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Weapons”. This declared any 
such use as “contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity” and 
“as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of 
humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization”. What is being 
universalised through this principle is a particular discourse about nuclear weapons in 
terms of what they do, what they mean, and modes of reasoning about violence and 
security that seek to stigmatise and criminalise the use and threat of use of nuclear 
weapons. In the language of rights, it is about a right to never be subjected to nuclear 
violence.
3) The norm of progress towards nuclear disarmament and its realisation is embedded 
in the NPT and ICJ’s 1996 advisory opinion. The NPT contains three core normative 
obligations of non-proliferation, cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and 
progress towards nuclear disarmament. The first two are widely accepted, institutiona-
lised and supported by the world’s major powers, particularly following the accession to 
the NPT of France, China, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil and the post-Soviet states in 
the 1990s. The normative obligation to realise nuclear disarmament was reinforced by the 
ICJ’s opinion that “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to 
a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict 
and effective international control” (International Court of Justice 1996). The TPNW’s 
preamble reaffirmed this language. Nevertheless, this norm is contested by the NWS in 
terms of urgency, the sequence of steps, and an obligation to plan for and achieve 
disarmament.
4) The norm of remediation for the harms caused by the prior or future use of nuclear 
weapons is reflected in Article 6 of the TPNW on victim assistance and environmental 
remediation. This obliges states parties to take “appropriate and necessary measures” to 
support people affected and redress environmental contamination caused by the use or 
testing of nuclear weapons under their jurisdiction or control. Article 7 also requires 
states parties to provide technical, material and financial support to other states affected 
by the use or testing of nuclear weapons where they are in a position to do so (see ICRC 
2018). The norm of remediation for harms caused by weapons or violent practices subject 
to restrictions has emerged through so-called “humanitarian arms control” or “humani-
tarian disarmament” treaties over the past two decades. Positive obligations of this type 
are found in Article 6(3) of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT), Article 5 of the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions (CCM), and Article 8(2) of the 2003 Protocol on Explosive Remnants 
of War to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons (Minor 2019). The MBT was the first such instrument to 
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embed these obligations, though victim assistance has a much longer heritage in huma-
nitarian law and practice (Dunworth 2020).
Beyond these four, the TPNW also reinforces a wider set of norms and principles 
of nuclear behaviour that illustrate the extent to which it is embedded in a much 
broader regime complex.6 These include: the NPT’s norm of non-proliferation and 
the principle of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes set out in the NPT 
and nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) treaties; norms of nuclear prohibition at 
a regional level set out in NWFZ treaties; the nuclear testing prohibition norm set 
out in a range of treaties, not least the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT); norms and principles of international humanitarian law applicable in 
armed conflict (all referenced in the TPNW preamble); and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards regime (referenced in the TPNW’s 
Article 3). For some states and NGOs, the TPNW also strengthens an emerging 
norm of financial divestment from activities and companies that support prohibited 
weapons.7 Maximising the authority of the TPNW is therefore about strengthening 
its core norms and principles in world politics, as well as reinforcing this wider web 
of restraints and obligations affecting nuclear behaviour. It is also, by extension, 
about promoting and embedding a set of understandings about security, violence, 
and international law in relation to nuclear weapons.
Moreover, the fact that the TPNW is embedded in this wider web of norms and obliga-
tions opens the door to engaging with states, including those that currently oppose the treaty. 
Research on norms shows that states can accept and internalise norms and principles that 
connect to well-established values, that have been repeatedly emphasised as important over 
other, perhaps contradictory, norms, and when they already adhere to similar norms (Rublee 
2009). For example, nuclear client states that oppose the TPNW already accept some of the 
treaty’s norms and principles in relation to nuclear weapons, for example the norm of nuclear 
weapons abstinence, as well as many of its other norms in related contexts, if not yet in 
relation to nuclear weapons, for example, the norm of unconditional prohibition of other 
weapons of mass destruction through the CWC and BTWC. This is important because 
norms can have an effect on sceptical or resistant states when they are linked with other 
widely accepted normative ideas (Krook and True 2010, 111).
Approaches to Universalisation with Non-nuclear-armed States
Maximising the authority of the treaty through more ratifications will require 
different approaches for different states. We identify four communities of states: 
nuclear-armed states; nuclear client states; non-nuclear armed states that can be 
6Lantis and Wunderlich’s work on “norm clusters” as “similarly aligned, coupled norms or principles” is relevant here. These 
are distinct but “speak to a common issue area and might be conceptually interlinked” and “may be cast into dense 
institutionalised structures in the form of international regimes” and embedded in wider international institutional and 
legal networks (Lantis and Wunderlich 2018, pp. 576, 578). Fukuda-Parr and Hulme similarly describe “supernorms” as 
“carefully structured sets of interrelated norms that pursue a grand prescriptive goal” and are “grouped into a unified and 
coherent framework”, such as a “supernorm” of nuclear disarmament as a “grand prescriptive goal” comprising a much 
broader set of interrelated norms, some of which are captured in the TPNW (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2011, 31).
7The obligation in Article 1(e) to never “Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity 
prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty” has been interpreted by some to mean that financing companies that 
produce or support nuclear weapons is prohibited as a form of assistance. Inclusion of a specific reference to financing 
was debated during the TPNW negotiations, but it did not make the final draft (Beenes and Snyder 2017).
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supportive of or ambivalent about nuclear disarmament; and non-nuclear armed 
states that are champions of nuclear disarmament, what Marianne Hanson called 
the “advocacy states” (Hanson 2010).8 Given context of the TPNW’s negotiation and 
opposition from nuclear-armed and client states, the focus of universalisation efforts 
after entry into force will initially be on advocacy states, other non-nuclear armed 
states, and perhaps a small number of nuclear client states. In the longer term, the 
TPNW contains provisions for wider universalisation through adoption by nuclear- 
armed states via pathways for the renunciation of nuclear weapons set out in 
Article 4.
TPNW supporters and TPNW stakeholders will have different roles to fulfil. The role 
of civil society in promoting universalisation of the TPNW will remain essential in 
advancing the treaty’s arguments in national and international discourse. The success 
of universalisation efforts by the TPNW member states will depend on complementary 
and even closely coordinated civil society campaign activities and strategies. A 2008 study 
by Oberdorster supports the importance of normative arguments and working with civil 
society, as well as embedding the case for the TPNW in the wider UN, NPT and IHL 
institutional architecture in order to secure further ratifications (Oberdorster 2008, 684).9
The TPNW’s Article 12 obligation, however, applies to states parties, and it is these 
that will have to devise strategies for engagement at governmental level with those states 
that have yet to join. The disarmament advocacy states will have an important role to play 
here. These strategies will be based on a set of narratives and practical activities that draw 
on universalisation experiences with similar treaties. For example, McLaughlin (2009, 65) 
identified in relation to the BTWC five reasons why states had yet to ratify it that provide 
lessons for the TPNW. These were: “1) Lack of awareness/information deficit; 2) 
Misunderstandings of the Convention, its provisions, implications and relation to 
other security, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties; 3) Resource burden; 4) 
Lack of political will and other competing priorities; 5) Constitutional/organizational 
difficulties (including parliamentary session interruptions, political upheavals and 
instability, and lack of relevant departments to deal with the issue).” Persuasion, argu-
ment and engagement will therefore be central to the process, especially with more 
authoritarian states that, by definition, tend to restrict political space for civil society 
engagement, resist the efforts of transnational advocacy networks and be less tolerant of 
political opposition. Narratives and practices for TPNW universalisation are outlined in 
the following sections.
Non-nuclear Armed States: Promoting a Positive Discourse
Increasing support for the treaty through further ratifications by non-nuclear-armed 
states will take political work. For these states, the pursuit of nuclear weapons is already 
prohibited under the NPT and they will essentially be doubling-up on their existing legal 
8Hanson defines these as “often small- or middle-sized nations, sometimes known as ‘Middle Powers’” that have “been 
instrumental in stimulating a strong civil society sector, ranging from mass-appeal nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) to think tanks and academic institutions supportive of the elimination of nuclear weapons” Hanson (2010, 72). 
For the humanitarian initiative and TPNW they include Austria, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and 
South Africa.
9The literature on transnational advocacy networks further illustrates this point (see Keck and Sikkink 1999; Price 2003).
78 N. RITCHIE AND A. A. KMENTT
obligations by ratifying the TPNW. The vast majority of these states – over 150 of the 193 
member States of the UN – have no nuclear weapons, are not allied to a nuclear-armed 
state, are members of the NPT, and have a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) 
in place with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 115 of these states are 
members of a NWFZ and have already prohibited nuclear weapons within the territory of 
their zone, including the development, acquisition, possession, placement, testing and 
use of such weapons.10 Most of these states also have a longstanding track record of 
supporting nuclear disarmament and an unconditional prohibition of nuclear weapons 
through statements in international fora and votes on UN General Assembly resolutions 
(Potter and Mukhatzhanova 2011). Moreover, 138 of these states supported the Austrian 
government’s “Humanitarian Pledge” in 201411 to “stigmatise, prohibit and eliminate 
nuclear weapons”, that made a significant contribution to the negotiation of the TPNW. 
Hence, the additional legal and administrative obligations resulting from joining the 
TPNW are easy to fulfil for non-nuclear armed states and the treaty is also in line with 
their traditional national positions on nuclear disarmament.
At the same time, many non-nuclear armed states are small and/or developing 
countries that could find it difficult to withstand the political pressure and forceful 
opposition against the TPNW from some of the world’s most powerful states. 
Moreover, nuclear disarmament is not necessarily a domestic political priority for 
many of these states amid many other urgent issues. The opposite is true of nuclear- 
armed states that vehemently oppose the TPNW and its challenge to what they consider 
their core interests and special status. Some non-nuclear armed states may therefore be 
supportive of the TPNW but nevertheless reluctant to join the treaty given the risks of 
adversely affecting their relations with TPNW opponents. Hathway (2005, 500–506) calls 
these anticipated “collateral consequences” of ratification. These arise from the expected 
reactions of domestic and international opponents of ratification that can influence 
a state’s decision to join a treaty. These can be consequences for foreign aid, domestic 
political support, trade, diplomatic initiatives and so on. Raising and keeping the TPNW 
and its universalisation as high as possible on the political agenda will, thus, be a key 
challenge for supporters of the treaty.
Making the case for the importance of the TPNW to potential new members will 
require effective ways of appealing to a sense of responsibility that emphasises the 
importance of them joining the treaty. This will be rooted in political arguments based 
on the importance of the treaty in world politics. Narratives in support of universalisation 
for non-nuclear-armed states will take two forms that are rooted in the TPNW’s core 
norms and principles but oriented towards the politics of joining the treaty: first, 
explaining the important positive contribution of the TPNW to the goal of nuclear 
disarmament and the positive contribution each state can make by joining the 
treaty; second, addressing the negative counternarrative against the TPNW to assist non- 
nuclear armed states in withstanding political campaigns they are likely to encounter 
from TPNW opponents (see Sanders-Zakre 2017). This section sets out four key argu-
ments about the positive contribution of the TPNW. These have already been articulated 
10For details, see United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs fact sheet on NWFZs <https://front.un-arm.org/wp- 
content/uploads/2020/07/NWFZ-Fact-Sheet-July2020.pdf>.
11127 signed up and/or endorsed to the Humanitarian Pledge issued by Austria in 2014. A further 11 States vote in 
support of the UN General Assembly Resolution on the “Humanitarian Pledge” in 2015 (see UNGA 2015).
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but will require frequent reiteration and development (see, for example, Acheson 2018; 
Nystuen, Egeland, and Hugo 2018b).
The first key argument is that the unequivocal prohibition of nuclear weapons creates 
the necessary legal framework for additional nuclear disarmament steps. The ratification 
of each additional state increases the authority of the treaty and normative and political 
pressure on the nuclear-armed states to take such steps. It also increases the pressure on 
nuclear client states regarding their stance on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. 
The greater the number of TPNW members, the greater the demand to prioritise 
progress on nuclear disarmament. As NPT NWS have failed to live up to their disarma-
ment commitments, supporting the TPNW constitutes a concrete step through which 
a non-nuclear armed state can contribute to the implementation of Article VI of the NPT 
and Action 1 of the 2010 NPT Action Plan, which called on “all States parties (. . .) to 
pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving 
a world without nuclear weapons” (UN 2010).
Secondly, by ratifying the TPNW a state makes an important contribution to strength-
ening the delegitimation of nuclear weapons, which is crucial to preventing further 
proliferation (see Ritchie 2013). It is very difficult to counter the further proliferation 
of nuclear weapons in the long run effectively whilst some of the world’s most powerful 
states continue to stress the necessity and legitimacy of these weapons, as the policies of 
nuclear-armed states and their clients routinely imply and demonstrate (Rathbun 2006). 
Without strong counterarguments and collective political pressure, the view that nuclear 
weapons are necessary and legitimate will be difficult to dislodge. The TPNW’s huma-
nitarian rationales and its norms and principles provide such counterarguments. By 
prohibiting these weapons and stigmatising them as morally indefensible and detrimental 
to principle of “undiminished security for all”12 the TPNW expands and embeds the 
illegitimacy of nuclear weapons and the practice of nuclear deterrence. In this sense, the 
TPNW is a much-needed legal-normative reinforcement of both nuclear non- 
proliferation and disarmament efforts at a time when credible leadership on nuclear 
disarmament by states that rely on these weapons is not forthcoming and when multi-
lateral approaches to transnational security challenges need reinvigorating.
Thirdly, by ratifying the TPNW, states have the opportunity to support the democra-
tisation of the global nuclear weapons debate. The TPNW represents a major step 
towards democratisation through an inclusive participatory process that was “open to 
all but blockable by none” (Johnson 2014) and through sovereign equality in the treaty 
text. On the former, the treaty was authorised and developed through the UN General 
Assembly, the central democratic body of the United Nations, and negotiated under the 
auspices of the UN with extensive involvement of civil society. On the latter, the treaty 
unequivocally prohibits nuclear weapons without exemptions or granting a special status 
on any issue to any actor or category of actors. It does not discriminate between nuclear 
armed states and non-nuclear armed states, as the NPT does. Moreover, the re-framing of 
12This principle has been a staple of NPT and UN disarmament discourse. It does not feature in the text of the NPT, but it 
does feature in subsequent Review Conference final documents. An early version can be found in the final outcome 
document of the 1978 UN Special Session on Disarmament in relation to the pursuit of “equitable and balanced” 
disarmament measures that “ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group 
of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security 
at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces” (UN 1978, 6).
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nuclear weapons as a global human security issue rather than a national state security 
matter between nuclear-armed states has given significant agency to a much broader 
group of states and other stakeholders, all of whom would be deeply affected by a nuclear 
war. The TPNW represents and legitimises an expectation that the threat to the survival 
of human civilisation posed by nuclear weapons is not and should not be the exclusive 
domain of nuclear-armed states according to their own national security prerogatives. As 
Shorna-Kay Richards, Deputy Permanent Representative of Jamaica to the UN, argued in 
2016, the “principles of equality and justice are at the core” of the humanitarian approach 
that had demonstrated “that the non-nuclear weapons States have a say in nuclear 
disarmament issues. Our voice matters. We have agency” (Richards 2016). These non- 
nuclear-armed state perspectives predate the TPNW but have largely been ignored in the 
multilateral frameworks that deal with nuclear weapons, as Dan Plesch has shown (2016). 
Every ratification of the treaty reinforces the democratisation of the global nuclear 
weapons debate.
A fourth key argument is the opportunity provided by the TPNW’s to challenge the 
value of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence for nuclear-armed states and their 
clients. These states have not provided answers or commented in any detail on the key 
issues raised in the context of the humanitarian initiative and the negotiation of the 
TPNW. The humanitarian initiative and TPNW highlighted the humanitarian conse-
quences and risks associated with the use of nuclear weapons and the practices of nuclear 
deterrence, and showed they are graver and more complex than previously understood. 
Yet there has been no substantive engagement with questions concerning the legitimacy 
and credibility of nuclear deterrence or the veracity of its assumptions in light of this 
knowledge. Questions about what level of aggregate global nuclear risks and what in 
terms of humanitarian consequences is acceptable and for whom have so far been left 
unanswered. Arguably, the lack of engagement on these legitimate questions is due to 
a lack of valid counterarguments by nuclear-armed states and their supporters. A more 
detailed conversation would inevitably entail admitting that the impact of nuclear 
weapons explosions would affect not only one’s own and the adversary’s populations, 
but also the populations of innocent bystander states. It would reveal a willingness to 
accept these effects on third states and potentially on all of humanity as a “necessary 
collateral” to maintaining a system of security based on nuclear deterrence. The more 
states that join the TPNW, the more pressure for exactly this kind of engagement will be 
generated and the more untenable the arguments in favour of maintaining policies of 
nuclear deterrence are likely to become (Kmentt 2020).
These outcomes from joining the TPNW can be framed as four key social goods that 
the treaty provides: a legal framework for future steps; reinforcing nuclear disarmament 
and non-proliferation through the delegitimation of nuclear weapons; contributing to 
the democratisation of global nuclear politics; and providing opportunities for engage-
ment with nuclear-armed states and their clients on the humanitarian agenda. It makes 
sense for states concerned with the lack of progress towards the shared goal of nuclear 
disarmament to support the TPNW on this basis. Evidently, these central positive 
messages in support of the TPNW should be made to all states, including the nuclear- 
armed and their supporters. However, these messages are much more likely to resonate 
in the first instance with non-nuclear armed states. Moreover, from a normative per-
spective there is an obligation upon many of these states to support the TPNW because 
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they have already accepted the treaty’s norms, rules and obligations as legitimate and 
want to maximise their authority, as noted above.
Non-nuclear-armed States: Outreach and Engagement
A positive narrative that clearly frames both the importance of the TPNW and the value 
for each non-nuclear-armed state in joining it will be central to growing the treaty’s 
membership. This narrative must be rooted in the positive effects of increasing the 
authority of the treaty, its core norms and principles, and its humanitarian, risk and 
ethical rationales. But universalisation strategies will also require a range of practical 
outreach and engagement activities that mobilise the case for joining the TPNW. This 
will need to be led by the nuclear disarmament advocacy states working closely with civil 
society.
Other humanitarian disarmament treaties, such as the 1997 MBT and the 2008 CCM 
provide useful ideas for practical universalisation efforts through universalisation ambas-
sadors, coordinators and contact groups. The MBT, for example, was supported by an 
informal universalisation contact group, comprised of states parties, the ICRC and the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). Different stakeholders exchanged 
information about activities they had undertaken and were planning in different states. 
The group served as a forum where universalisation efforts could be planned, coordi-
nated and made more effective. It also fostered a common sense of purpose and a culture 
of collaboration and coordination between member states and civil society organisations. 
The activities of the contact group were reported by its coordinator to the Meeting of 
States Parties, where formal decisions relating to the universalisation of the MBT were 
taken and universalisation activities were endorsed and encouraged. States parties of the 
MBT also designated personalities to undertake universalisation efforts in support of the 
treaty at high level.13 The first Review Conference of the MBT in 2004 adopted an Action 
Plan, the first section of which was dedicated to treaty universalisation based on seven 
commitments (Nairobi Action Plan 2004). This practice was followed up by similar 
commitments in subsequent meetings of States Parties.
The CCM contains a similar provision on universalisation to the TPNW.14 States 
parties to the CCM adopted the “Vientiane Action Plan” at its first Meeting of States 
Parties in 2010. Its first section was devoted to promoting the universalisation of the 
Convention (Vientiane Action Plan 2010). This served as a road map until the First 
Review Conference in 2015, which adopted another Action Plan covering the subsequent 
five-year period (Dubrovnik Action Plan 2015). In the CCM, two states parties act as 
formal coordinators for universalisation. To facilitate the coordination of universalisa-
tion activities, an Informal Working Group on CCM universalisation was established, 
which operates in a similar fashion to the MBT contact group.
The TPNW states parties could chose to follow similar approaches to coordinate 
universalisation activities by establishing either a more informal contact group or by 
formally designating universalisation coordinators. States parties could also commit to 
13HRH Prince Mired Raad Al-Hussein of Jordan, HRH Princess Astrid of Belgium and Colombian music artist and anti- 
landmines activist, Juanes, made such commitments.
14Article 21 (1) of the CCM stipulates that “Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this Convention to ratify, 
accept, approve or accede to this Convention, with the goal of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention”.
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specific actions to foster universalisation through decisions taken at TPNW Meetings of 
States parties. These different options will certainly be discussed in some detail at the first 
Meeting of States Parties of the TPNW and could be incorporated into an action plan. In 
any case, a close coordination of universalisation efforts will be one of the key elements 
for growing the treaty’s membership.
The classical form in which to make the case for the TPNW to non-states parties is 
through diplomatic outreach activities by TPNW members. This can be done in a variety 
of ways. TPNW states can undertake diplomatic demarches, either on their own or in 
a group of TPNW supporters, in capitals of non-states parties, impressing upon the 
recipient of the demarche the value of the treaty and the political importance of their 
signature and ratification. Group demarches can be conducted in a cross-regional format 
with states parties from different parts of the globe to underscore the universal value of 
a prohibition of nuclear weapons. A demarche from states parties from the same region 
can also be an effective format, given the closer political ties between states from the same 
region, especially where the region is a formal nuclear weapon-free zone. What’s impor-
tant here is that TPNW members listen to and constructively engage with the concerns of 
non-nuclear armed states that have yet to join the treaty, especially around the “collateral 
consequences” of ratification referred to above. As Mclaughlin observed in relation to the 
BTWC, “Answering the specific concerns identified by non-States parties is imperative in 
demonstrating that States Parties place importance on the Convention and that they are 
taking each and every country seriously” McLaughlin (2009, 68).
States parties can promote universalisation by raising the TPNW in communications 
between high-level officials from TPNW states and non-states parties. Bilateral political 
meetings, for example between heads of state or at ministerial level, or in letters and 
phone calls are examples for such opportunities. Ideally, these activities in different non- 
states parties would be coordinated among TPNW supporters. The more the TPNW is 
raised at the political level, the more effectively its importance and the weight of 
expectation and encouragement to sign and ratify the treaty can be communicated.
TPNW supporters can also coordinate efforts to highlight the importance of the 
TPNW in political communiques and resolutions, for example at regional meetings. 
Such documents are usually political statements without a legally binding character, but 
they provide political cover for non-states parties to express support for the TPNW and 
move towards signature and ratification. In addition, joint regional or cross-regional 
statements in multilateral fora in support of the TPNW can be effective in bringing states 
closer to the TPNW short of joining the treaty, perhaps as observer states.
Universalisation of the TPNW can also be supported by increasing the number of 
states voting in favour of the relevant resolutions before the UN General Assembly. Such 
yes-votes are an important way of signalling political support and a potential stepping- 
stone for states to move towards joining the TPNW. In 2020, for example, the resolution 
on the TPNW at the UN General Assembly First Committee received 130 votes in favour 
(Assembly 2020).15 Support for this resolution will be an important indication of support 
for the treaty and momentum behind universalisation efforts. States parties as well as 
NGOs will undoubtedly try to convince more states to support this resolution.
15Voting results available at <https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com20/ 
votes-ga/399DRII.pdf>.
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Some states with more limited resources would benefit significantly from technical 
support for the ratification process. This can be provided through capacity building 
activities, such as workshops and seminars, to explain the provisions of the TPNW in 
detail and help clarify the steps a prospective state party would have to undertake to 
implement the treaty. Again, the MBT and the CCM, as well as the 2014 Arms Trade 
Treaty (ATT)16 provide useful examples for capacity building efforts to facilitate the 
implementation of these treaties and promote their universalisation. Legislation toolkits 
and model laws can also provide valuable assistance to states to simplify the domestic 
ratification process. Such a model law for the TPNW was prepared by the ICRC in 2019 
and a guide to TPNW signature and ratification was provided by the United Nations 
Office for Disarmament Affairs (ICRC 2018; UNODA 2017).
International conferences and regional workshops and seminars as well as the com-
missioning of studies and publications to promote the case for the TPNW are important 
ways to raise awareness of the treaty. These were key features of universalisation efforts 
for the MBT and the CCM for which a large number of such meetings have taken place.17 
On the one hand, such meetings facilitate treaty implementation among its members. On 
the other hand, they help to raise political attention within a region and create incentives 
and pressure on non-members to join. Future meetings of states parties of the TPNW will 
provide key venues and opportunities to raise awareness and political attention on the 
treaty and, in particular, to highlight the positive arguments in support of the treaty and 
for each non-nuclear-armed state to join it outlined above. Universalisation efforts will be 
helped by more regional and international activities to refocus nuclear weapons discourse 
on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons detonations and thereby make the case 
for the TPNW. These could be organised through NWFZ organisations such as 
OPANAL (the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and 
the Caribbean) to encourage accession on a regional NWFZ basis.
International conferences, regional workshops, and research reports were also key features 
of the processes that generated awareness of and support for the humanitarian initiative and 
later the negotiation of the TPNW. However, there is the important practical issue of financial 
resources for these activities for universalising the treaty. In the case of the MBT and the 
CCM, for example, Western states, such as Norway, Germany or Canada predominantly 
organised and financed events to support these treaties either directly or through funding of 
NGOs. Most of these states at the time of writing oppose the TPNW, but this could change. 
The financial resources that will be available to finance activities to promote the universalisa-
tion of the TPNW and to support NGO activities are, thus, likely to be much more limited. 
This situation will almost certainly be further exacerbated by budgetary pressures in TPNW 
states parties in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic. The TPNW states parties’ implementa-
tion of Article 12 is therefore likely to focus on existing multilateral and regional fora, such as 
the UN General Assembly and regional and sub-regional organisations.
16For more information on the Arms Trade Treaty, see <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/>.
17For more information on regional meetings and workshops see for the MBT <https://www.apminebanconvention.org/> 
and for the CCM <https://www.clusterconvention.org/>.
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Engaging with Nuclear Client States
So far we have focussed on growing the membership of non-nuclear-armed states. But 
states parties to the treaty, especially the nuclear disarmament advocacy states, must also 
engage with nuclear client states and, where possible, nuclear-armed states. These two 
groups remain committed to nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. The five NPT 
NWS, NATO, as well as individual NATO members have clearly stated their opposition 
to the TPNW. Engaging the nuclear-armed states on the TPNW will be very difficult for 
the time being, but engaging nuclear client states in ways that encourage accession to the 
treaty holds more promise. This will require some similar forms of outreach to those 
outlined above, but the discursive engagement will be different in two ways that we 
outline here: first, in terms of rebuking a set of negative arguments about the TPNW; 
and, second, in terms of stimulating debate in nuclear client states on the humanitarian, 
risk and ethical rationales underpinning the TPNW.
Countering the Negative Discourse
Critics of the TPNW have framed the TPNW in a negative way as problematic (Ford 
2017; Highsmith and Stewart 2018; Vilmer 2020). Countering these arguments will be 
important for non-nuclear-armed states and nuclear client states, but they hold more 
sway in the capitals of the latter (similarly, engaging nuclear client states with the positive 
arguments in support of TPNW outlined above will also be important). Four negative 
arguments in particular have been articulated. We argue that though they lack merit, they 
have substantial power because of the power of those articulating them.
The first argument is that the TPNW is a distraction from a practical and tested step- 
by-step nuclear disarmament approach. This is straight-forward to rebuke because the 
TPNW cannot distract from steps that are not being taken by nuclear-armed states. The 
action plans agreed by consensus at the NPT Review Conferences of 2000 and 2010 are 
withering on the vine. The goal of the TPNW is to create a sharper focus for such steps to 
actually be taken. Moreover, the idea that there exists comprehensive “step-by-step” plan 
for nuclear disarmament as an alternative to the TPNW is itself misleading. Nuclear 
disarmament both as an objective and as a process has been widely contested for many 
decades. The TPNW and its supporters do not argue that nuclear disarmament can or 
will happen overnight. If nuclear weapons are successfully eliminated from human 
affairs, the process will undoubtedly unfold in a series of steps, some of which are likely 
to be organised and some organic and serendipitous. A comprehensive set of prohibi-
tions represented by the TPNW is a crucial part of the process, but it is not in competi-
tion with an alternative plan, since no such plan exists.18 What it is in competition with is 
a set of deeply embedded ideas held by powerful states about the necessity and legitimacy 
of nuclear weapons and, potentially, very extreme levels of nuclear violence.
Second, the TPNW (and its supporters) are accused of sowing divisions in the 
international community on the nuclear weapons issue. Such divisions, however, are 
not created by the TPNW but are a result of the lack of implementation of the NPT’s 
18Kjolv Egeland (2020b) deconstructs the nostalgic view that a consensus emerged after the Cold War on both the 
objective of nuclear disarmament and a blueprint to get there that has somehow been lost, must now be recovered, 
and that the TPNW distracts from that endeavour, concluding that it never existed in the first place.
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Article VI by the NWS. The TPNW is intended to address this. The accusation of division 
also comes from those states that refused to engage on the issue of the humanitarian 
consequences of nuclear weapons and in the TPNW process. Moreover, debate, division, 
and contestation are vital to processes of change and a necessary feature of democratic 
debate in nuclear politics to which the TPNW makes a vital contribution (Egeland 2017).
Third, opponents also allege the inefficacy of the TPNW because nuclear-armed states 
collectively oppose the treaty. In their view, as noted above, the TPNW will not con-
tribute to or lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons (Sagan and Valentino 2017). 
Apart from the redundancy and circularity of this argument, the TPNW doescreate the 
legal basis for nuclear disarmament. Moreover, we cannot know in advance how effective 
the treaty will be over the long term. Evidence from other humanitarian disarmament 
treaties (such as the MBT) and other nuclear initiatives (such as the movement against 
nuclear testing) certainly suggests that significant change is possible (Bolton, Njeri, and 
Benjamin-Britton 2020). The treaty's effectiveness, as argued above, will be a function of 
the strength of its core norms and principles and the discourse this will stimulate about 
the treaty’s underlying humanitarian, risk and ethical arguments in relation to nuclear 
weapons and nuclear deterrence.19 The treaty’s challenge to the legality and legitimacy of 
nuclear weapons therefore has the potential of impacting nuclear weapon-related 
policies.
A fourth frequently voiced criticism is that the TPNW is based only on humanitarian 
arguments and does not take the international security environment into account. This 
presumes quite a narrow framework for deciding what counts as security and what does 
not. In fact, the TPNW is the result of legitimate security concerns based on threat 
perceptions stemming from the risk of the use of nuclear weapons due to the collective 
reliance on nuclear deterrence by nuclear armed states and their clients. This is not 
merely a humanitarian but a valid and pertinent security perspective. Opponents of the 
TPNW neither own the exclusive right to interpret the NPT (see below) nor are they the 
sole arbiter of what counts as security and whose security perspectives are more valid 
than others. Moreover, the corollary of this argument is that one must wait for an 
idealised future security environment in which nuclear deterrence is no longer deemed 
necessary as a precondition for nuclear disarmament. This is disingenuous. There will 
always be real or perceived security imbalances between states, which, if one follows this 
line of argument, will provide excuses in perpetuity to sustain the nuclear status quo 
(Ritchie 2017).
Fifth, some have postulated that the TPNW is incompatible with the NPT. TPNW 
supporters possibly see this as the most disingenuous argument against the TPNW 
because this point is raised by those states whose own lacklustre implementation of 
nuclear disarmament under the NPT is the reason why the humanitarian initiative and 
the TPNW processes were initiated in the first place. Moreover, the negotiations of the 
TPNW were marked by utmost care to ensure that the TPNW aligns with existing 
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agreements, especially the NPT. The treaty 
explicitly and structurally fits into the framework created by the NPT and constitutes 
19Recent arguments against the recapitalisation of the US ICBM arsenal based on the unacceptable climatic effects of 
a nuclear war that involved the use, or the destruction of those missiles on their silos with Russian nuclear weapons, are 
a useful case in point (Clarke and Andreasen 2021).
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a necessary and effective measure for the implementation of its Article VI and of Action 1 
of the 2010 NPT Action Plan (Hajnoczi 2020).
We recognise that nuclear disarmament will be a difficult process and it is self-evidently 
debatable as to how or whether the TPNW can make a significant contribution, but the idea 
that the TPNW is itself a problem in relation to the NPT, to security, or to what it might or 
might not achieve is misplaced. These and other criticisms of the TPNW do not stand up to 
scrutiny and/or cannot be substantiated (see Soares 2018). Rather, they are the expressions 
of a politically motivated counternarrative from states that object to the TPNW because of 
the challenge it presents to the nuclear status quo. States that consider joining the TPNW, 
and constituencies supportive of the TPNW within states that are not, will have to be 
equipped with these arguments to counter these familiar criticisms.
Opening up the Humanitarian Discourse in Nuclear Client States
Beyond debunking these criticisms, the most effective strategy for nuclear client states will 
be to use the discussion on the TPNW as a lever to highlight the humanitarian conse-
quences of nuclear weapons, the risks associated with these weapons and the legal and 
ethical questions regarding the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons and the 
practice of nuclear deterrence. This discourse can be legitimately demanded and conducted 
whether one agrees or disagrees with the legal dimension of the TPNW. Recent analysis on 
the consequences of nuclear explosions and nuclear risks are based on empirically demon-
strable facts and raise very serious issues about responsibility, legitimacy and what collective 
security means in the context of the nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence (Borrie, 
Caughley, and Wan 2017). Ultimately, a serious engagement with the TPNW and its 
underlying rationale leads to a conversation about the veracity of the assumptions on 
which a nuclear deterrence-based security architecture is based. In this discussion, the 
gravity of the consequences and the complexity of risks of the use of nuclear weapons can 
be weighed against the posited security benefit of nuclear weapons. The TPNW poses the 
question about the balance of probability between the belief that nuclear weapons deter and 
prevent large-scale wars and the knowledge that deterrence, including nuclear deterrence, 
can fail and the foreseeable catastrophic humanitarian and other consequences that would 
follow. Any discussion on the TPNW with nuclear client states and nuclear-armed states 
will offer opportunities to highlight and advance these arguments.
The extent to which such a broad debate can be stimulated will vary between countries. 
The role of civil society to demand and facilitate this engagement will be vital and their 
critical voice will certainly be heard more in democratic societies than in autocratic ones. It 
is likely that public discourse in nuclear client states where there is scepticism towards 
nuclear weapons will be most open to the humanitarian consequences and risk arguments 
(ICAN 2018). In some of these states, the contradictions between professed support for 
a world without nuclear weapons and the desire and declared priority of defending the 
credibility of multilateralism and international law20 on the one hand, and the actual 
policies of reliance on nuclear deterrence on the other will likely become more apparent.
20See for example the “Alliance for Multilateralism” at <https://multilateralism.org> established in 2019 by France and 
Germany, in which most nuclear-armed client states participate.
JOURNAL FOR PEACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 87
A key issue that will have to be addressed in many nuclear client states, is the 
relationship between the TPNW and obligations within NATO. NATO has stated on 
several occasions its opposition to the TPNW based, inter alia, on the counterarguments 
outlined above (for example NATO 2020). This reflects a concern in NATO about the 
profound implications of the TPNW for the legitimacy of nuclear weapons and the 
practice of nuclear deterrence.21 By continuously expressing opposition to the TPNW, 
NATO seeks to make it politically difficult, if not impossible, for allies to soften their 
position on the treaty. Any such change would be portrayed as a breach of alliance 
solidarity and cohesion.
Supporters of the TPNW will have to underscore in the domestic debate within NATO 
allies that NATO membership is, as such, not dependent on agreement with or participa-
tion in nuclear deterrence policies. Nuclear deterrence is not addressed in the North 
Atlantic Treaty and taking part in NATO’s nuclear activities is not a legal requirement 
for membership. In fact, it was only in 2010 that NATO first referred to itself as a “nuclear 
alliance” (Kjølv Egeland 2020a; NATO 2010, 5). Opposition to the TPNW is, thus, 
a political choice but “(. . .) NATO member states bear no legal obligation to support 
extended nuclear deterrence or the retention of nuclear weapons. From a legal point of 
view, accession to the TPNW is compatible with NATO membership” (Nystuen, Egeland, 
and Hugo 2018a, 5). It would, thus, also be a political choice for NATO allies to “(. . .) 
pursue diplomatic action within NATO to modify nuclear policy to be compatible with the 
TPNW, or, failing to obtain such a change, to disavow nuclear deterrence on a national 
basis” (Meyer 2020). Similarly, NATO allies could choose to declare individually or 
collectively their wish of moving away from a nuclear deterrence-based security architec-
ture (Kmentt 2021). A broader discourse on the TPNW in nuclear client states could, thus, 
lead to a recognition that they, too, understand nuclear deterrence as an unsustainable 
proposition for the long run given the humanitarian consequences and risks of the use of 
nuclear weapons to the undiminished security of all humankind. Subsequently, these states 
could disassociate themselves from the nuclear weapons dimension of NATO and initiate 
concrete steps towards the replacement of nuclear deterrence with other forms of deter-
rence and conflict management. This kind of engagement could be a key focus and possible 
political deliverable of universalisation efforts in nuclear client states.
Conclusion
Universalisation of the TPNW is a strategy for maximising the treaty’s authority and its 
core norms and principles in world politics in order to influence the policies of the 
nuclear-armed and their supporters. Growing its membership is essential to this. The 
TPNW with its compelling rationales of humanitarian consequences, risks, and ethics in 
relation to nuclear weapons has provided its supporters with a strong argumentative 
toolbox. This toolbox can be used effectively to promote the treaty’s universalisation and 
to challenge the stagnant state of nuclear disarmament. Universalisation strategies based 
on tailored narratives and outreach practices will have an impact if a broader and more 
21See for example the “United States Non-Paper: ‘Defense Impacts of Potential United Nations General Assembly Nuclear 
Weapons Ban Treaty; Note by the Secretary” (NATO 2016). This document lists several ways in which a ban could be 
effective, including by limiting nuclear-weapons-related planning, training, and transit or allowing allies to use, plan, or 
train to use nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-sharing practices.
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intensive societal discourse on nuclear weapons actually takes place. For the foreseeable 
future, this impact will be measured in additional ratifications, most likely from non- 
nuclear armed states, but also in the extent to which the TPNW enables its stakeholders 
to change the terms of the global nuclear weapons debate based on the arguments 
outlined here. In nuclear client states, and perhaps even some nuclear-armed states, 
the measure of success will be the extent to which the TPNW enables a more robust 
democratic debate that challenges current nuclear weapons policies and opens up the 
range of politically acceptable policy choices for this and the next generation of political 
leaders. More pressure and more demands for concrete nuclear disarmament measures 
and credible steps to reduce and move away from a reliance on nuclear weapons would 
constitute an important outcome of universalisation strategies.
The political opposition to this challenge will be formidable. The power asymmetries 
between the two competing institutions of nuclear disarmament and nuclear deterrence 
mean coercive power is more readily available to supporters of deterrence than disarma-
ment. Socialisation into the TPNW’s norms, principles and rationales will therefore 
necessarily be rooted in persuasion, argument and engagement. The key question for 
states that support the TPNW is whether the treaty and the goal of a world without 
nuclear weapons can be cemented as a high-level political priority in the coming years 
through the universalisation narratives and activities outlined above. To achieve this, the 
role of civil society in keeping the TPNW and the nuclear weapons issue in the public eye 
and demanding sustained engagement and political action on nuclear disarmament to 
reduce the risk of nuclear violence will be crucial. Equally, sustaining universalisation 
efforts and regular engagement with hold-outs, in particular non-nuclear armed states in 
the first instance, will be essential to the treaty’s momentum.
It is important, however, to acknowledge that universalising the TPNW is not about 
embedding new norms and principles, or about cascading new or established norms and 
principles from a standing start. It is about consolidating an already-established set of 
norms and principles by moving some from a conditional to an unconditional status (for 
example, from conditional to unconditional prohibition), expanding the scope of others 
to include nuclear weapons (for example on positive obligations and security in relation 
to indiscriminate forms of violence), and injecting new energy into others (notably the 
norm of progress towards nuclear disarmament). But it is also about adding new political 
weight to this set in order to challenge those structures of power that are resistive of them. 
In that way, the TPNW is a cumulative contribution to this set of norms, principles and 
institutions that includes the NPT, IHL, IHRL (international human rights law), UNGA 
resolutions, the ICJ Advisory Opinion, NWFZs, the IAEA, CTBT, CWC, BTWC, CCM, 
and so on. Moreover, this set of norms and principles is not something that can be 
separated from the global and national politics of nuclear weapons and ignored, it is 
intrinsic to it.
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